About
I am a development economist specialising in public and organizational economics, with a focus on the state, digital infrastructure, and markets in Chile and sub-Saharan Africa. My work studies how frictions in each shape firms and the public sector. I argue that how the state and markets are organized matters as much as how well they are resourced.
In 2026, I was a Visiting Researcher at the University of Oslo. Previously, I was a Research Analyst at the Central Bank of Chile. I hold a B.Sc. and M.Sc. in Economics from the University of Chile.
I am on the 2026–2027 job market.
Job Market Paper
Less Paper, More Public Service: Communication Technology inside the State
[ Abstract | Paper ]
Public services often leave capacity unused while demand goes unmet. These gaps can persist because the decisions that would close them require information to travel between state entities, often as paper documents. I exploit the staggered rollout of a digital platform in Chile that replaced paper in official communication between state entities. Within the national public childcare agency, digital adoption cuts document processing times by 70%, and documents from the departments that coordinate enrollment rise, concentrated in the months when seats are assigned. Enrollment at the agency’s centers rises by 11%, with no increase in capacity, and no detectable change in applications per eligible child or at providers outside the reform. The increase is concentrated in centers whose enrollment relies more on these documents. The pattern is consistent with better communication between state entities raising public output.
Work in Progress
Bringing the Internet Home: Data Centers and Economic Activity in Africa
[ Abstract ]
Data centers bring the internet closer to its users. They host content, cloud tools, and the exchanges where networks connect. Does that make the internet function better or differently? And what ultimately changes locally if it does? We study the opening of data centers across Africa. We use millions of measurements of internet routes, and define exposure to a data center before it opens through a technical criterion, to begin to inform these questions.
Internet Providers and Political Regimes
[ Abstract ]
Governments that are less accountable or attentive to their citizens may control access to information and communication through its internet providers, for example by licensing less capable internet providers in exchange for more power to shut down or control the network. We study such matching and its downstream consequences in Africa.
Working Papers
Market power, ownership concentration and income inequality
[ Abstract | Draft pending disclosure review by the Central Bank of Chile ]
We quantify the distributional effects of market power by decomposing capital income into competitive returns and market-power rents and assigning these components to ultimate individual owners. Using matched firm-level and taxpayer-level administrative data for Chile from 2008 to 2016, we estimate firm-level markups and trace monopoly rents through ownership networks. Capital income is highly concentrated, but competitive returns are more skewed than market-power rents because very large firms exhibit lower markups. As a result, market-power rents account for a smaller share of income at the very top of the distribution. Inequality decompositions imply that reductions in market power lower inequality despite increases in competitive returns, as the associated rise in the labor share dominates. Our results provide new empirical evidence on how ownership structure mediates the link between market power and inequality.
Financial Constraints and Firm Adjustments During a Sales Disruption
[ Abstract | Paper ]
We address two main questions: (i) how do firms respond to an unanticipated shock to their cash flows, and (ii) what is the role of financial constraints in mediating such response? To answer these questions, we study the behavior of Chilean firms during the 2019 social unrest, which caused a series of disruptions to the firms' activity over several months. Exploiting quasi-experimental variation in the exposure of firms to these incidents, we find that more exposed firms experience larger declines in sales, larger employment losses, and are more likely to fall behind in their financial obligations than less affected firms. Moreover, these responses are significantly stronger for those firms more likely to be financially constrained. A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that constrained firms translate almost half the decline in sales into lower demand for labor and intermediate inputs, more than double the transmission of unconstrained firms.
Pre-PhD
Telling schools apart: the role of preferences, constraints, and the ability to differentiate between schools in parents' choices
[ Abstract | Paper ]
Limitations in the ability of parents to compare schools have important implications for market-oriented educational systems, which rely on parents' choices to improve quality through competition. To empirically study these limitations, we develop and estimate a static model of elementary school choice that distinguishes between preferences for academic quality, the ability to differentiate between schools of different quality, and constraints in terms of the schools available to different households. Because school quality might be endogenous to parents' choices, we identify the key parameters related to preferences for quality using exogenous variation in schools' funding introduced by a policy that substantially increased the voucher amount for each enrolled socioeconomically vulnerable student. We estimate the model using a combination of administrative and survey data from Chile, which includes rich information on how parents compare the academic quality of schools. Using counterfactual simulations, we find the interaction between limitations to tell schools apart and differences in preferences across households plays an important role in decreasing the quality of schools attended by Chilean children, especially for children with less educated parents.
Teaching
Teaching Assistant, Queen Mary University of London (2023–2026)
Instructor, Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez, Chile (2016–2017)
Teaching Assistant, University of Chile (2013–2017)
Policy Work
2019: Predictive models of default and recovery of corporate loans, Central Bank of Chile, with E. Cerletti, J. Fernández, & A. Vásquez.
2019: "Economic groups as a unit of analysis for financial stability" — Box IV.2, Financial Stability Report S2-2019, Central Bank of Chile, with Patricio Toro.